In this paper I consider why the expected English backlash to the asymmetric UK devolution settlement has not yet materialised. Using a corpus of conversational interviews, I discuss the various ways in which people in England currently understand the relationship between national identity and political entitlement. I conclude that English political quiescence, far from constituting an enigma, is comprehensible in the light of the fact that members of the general public do not normally base assessments of political legitimacy on calculations of English national self-interest defined in contrast to Scotland. Rather, political issues tend to be judged on the bases of equity and procedural justice. English identity is rarely considered legitimate grounds for political voice. Rather, most people evidence a concern to balance a recognition of Scottish rights to national self-determination with an endorsement of the normative requirements of public reason, civility and civic responsibility incumbent upon the English majority.
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The Government need to make up their mind what they think they are doing.
Is their devolution policy based on regionalism or nationalism? If I understand the Bill correctly, I must conclude that the Government are acting on a sense of Scottish national self-identity. If that is so, the Bill is about nationalism, which is why I worry about the reawakening of English nationalism.
On whatever concept the Bill is based, the Government simply have to treat the other three parts of the United Kingdom in exactly the same way, because if they do not, as others have said before me, they will provoke an English backlash. Indeed, I get the impression that that backlash has already begun. British Social Attitudes surveys found little evidence of general resentment (Curtice, 2003; Curtice & Heath, 2000; Curtice & Seyd, 2001; Curtice & Sandford, 2004) , and Devolution and English identity 5 relatively low levels of popular support for the establishment of an English Parliament or the development of English regional governance (e.g. Heath, Rothon & Jarvis, 2002) . As Aughey (2007) summarised the situation, 'The impression (so far) is not one of simmering outrage but one of national equanimity ' (p. 198) . Contrary to the Earl of Onslow's confident prediction, the English appeared to have simply put up with it.
Crisis? What crisis?
In this article, I shall be considering why the resentful English backlash, predicted so confidently a decade ago, has not materialised. Interestingly, this question has rarely been asked. Survey researchers are generally content to note that the asymmetric settlement apparently reflects the 'settled will of the English people' (e.g. Bogdanor, 2005; Curtice & Seyd, 2001 ), sometimes casting this as a curious enigma, 'people in England may accept the principle of asymmetric devolution … strangely, people in England do not appear to be particularly keen on devolution for themselves ' Curtice (2006 p. 104 , my emphasis).
On the rare occasions when commentators have attempted to explain this unanticipated state of affairs, they have been disinclined to consider the possibility that the original forecasts might have been built upon false premises. Rather, they typically resort to speculative assertions concerning pathologies of English national character. Two kinds of account predominate. First are those that attribute the absence of English political response to apathy: a moral or motivational failure, often seen to be the product of arrogance, complacency or lethargy. As the political commentator Andrew Marr iii put it:
'You hear people yelling about some looming crisis. What do you do?
You sit back, sip your cooling tea and don't bother your fat backside.
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How else can we explain the utter lack of interest in the possibility of the breakup of Britain, at least as far as the English majority is concerned?'
'Apathy' is a convenient construct for explaining away any form of political inaction. However, whether this can provide an adequate explanation for English political quiescence in the aftermath of UK devolution is questionable. Political scientists have certainly interpreted the tendency for people in England to respond to survey questions concerning devolution using the 'don't know' option and avoiding the 'strongly agree/disagree' response categories, as prima facie evidence of English 'indifference' (Curtice & Sandford, 2004) . However these same response styles can also be used to convey ambivalence, a strongly held middle-of-the-road attitude, or employed when the respondent does not understand the question. In addition, any explanation of political quiescence needs to be able to distinguish between situations in which people are passively detached from current public debates, and those in which political disengagement is actively motivated by concerns over civil etiquette and democratic respect (Condor & Gibson, 2006; Eliasoph, 1998) .
A second form of explanation focuses on a supposed cognitive deficiency of the English public. Specifically, it is suggested that people in England have somehow failed to recognize their identity, and hence their distinctive interests, as English.
These arguments draw upon widely available stereotypes to the effect that people in England do not know the difference between Englishness and Britishness (cf. Condor, 2006; Condor & Abell, 2006) , or that they simply lack any sense of national identity (cf. Aughey, 2007) . Once again, this line of argument is rather short on substantiating evidence. In the first place, survey researchers have found little statistical relationship in England between individual respondents' reports of their sense of national identity and their constitutional preferences (Curtice & Seyd, 2001 (Condor, 1996; Condor & Abell, 2006) .
Finally, as an explanation of political quiescence, identity-deficit explanations often appear to rest upon a rather dubious form of syllogistic reasoning: Since political action may be promoted by national identity, it therefore follows that inaction must be due to an absence of national identity. This line of argument overlooks the possibility that policy preferences could ever be motivated by concerns other than those of perceived national group self-interest. In addition, it rests upon the tacit presumption that the only way in which national identity may be manifested politically is through the 'rational' pursuit of national self-interest.
Commonsense Political Reasoning in England.
In the process of discussing the response of the population of England to Second, the interviews were designed to tap the types of vocabulary and lines of argument that people might use in their everyday lives. Potential participants were informed simply that the research concerned 'how people feel about the places they live'. The interviews generally took the form of sociable encounters (sometimes described as 'chats') that took place in informal locales such as public houses, parks, coffee shops, or in the respondents' homes. Respondents were initially encouraged to speak freely about their family history, experiences of mobility and travel, local community and political involvement. In cases where the respondent's own narrative led them to spontaneously mention issues relating to national identity and devolved governance, the interviewers restricted their contribution to general prompts. In cases where the interviewers resorted to actively shaping the direction of the conversation, they only started to do so after it was clear that the respondent was entirely relaxed and was conversing in an unselfconscious fashion.
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Some of the interviews were conducted as part of a panel study designed to analyse transformations in popular understandings of national identity and citizenship in the immediate aftermath of the establishment of the Scottish Parliament v . In practice, however, the kinds of argument that people in England employ when discussing the process of devolved governance has remained remarkably stable over time. This is true both at the level of the population and at the level of the individual (REFERENCE WITHHELD).
In his account of the advantages of conversational interviewing for mapping everyday political reasoning, Lane (1962, p. 9) emphasised how this technique may provide 'insight into connotative meanings of words or phrases', enabling the analyst to 'follow the course of associative thinking' and to appreciate 'the mechanisms of argument and evasion employed with sensitive political material'. In the following pages I shall start out by briefly noting some common features of the interview accounts. I shall then go on to distinguish four different types of argument that respondents could use when discussing the legitimacy of devolved governance and formulating views concerning the relationship between national identity and political entitlement.
Common Features in English Accounts of Devolution.
Perceived situational relevance of English national identity.
In view of the heterogeneous character of the sample it was hardly surprising that respondents differed in the ways in which they described their own sense of national identity. In addition, it was apparent that the same individual's account of their sense of national identity could vary according to rhetorical context. However, in the course of discussing devolution, all respondents spontaneously adopted an English national footing, often contrasting an English we and here with a Scottish them and Devolution and English identity 10
there. This tendency was apparent even among people who in other contexts refused to position themselves in national terms, and among those from minority ethnic backgrounds who consistently claimed never to regard themselves as English.
Lack of specific knowledge concerning the devolution process.
Respondents generally displayed a basic awareness of UK constitutional reform in so far as the vast majority were at least aware of the existence of the Scottish Parliament. However, very few possessed detailed information about the devolution process, and few displayed any meaningful awareness of debates concerning the prospect of English regional governance. Significantly, respondents
were also generally unaware of those particular issues that political scientists predicted might constitute a 'source of tension' (Curtice & Seyd, 2001 p. 230 ). For example, there was little evidence that people knew much about the fiscal relationship between Scotland and England. When respondents did mention fiscal matters, many assumed that the population of Scotland was disadvantaged in terms of public expenditure and that policies initiated by the Scottish Parliament had been financed by taxes levied in Scotland. On the relatively rare occasions that people recognized that the population of Scotland enjoyed a higher share of UK public expenditure than the population of England, they tended to assume that this had been determined on a calculation of relative need, and was therefore a fair arrangement.
Distinctions between attitude objects.
Summaries of survey data often gloss questions concerning various policy issues pertaining to UK constitutional change in generic terms (for example, as 'attitudes towards the principle of asymmetric devolution'). However, respondents' conversational interview accounts were often more nuanced than these kinds of 
English interests not calculated through comparison with Scotland.
As we have seen, elite predictions concerning an impending English backlash generally presumed that resentment would arise once people in England recognized that Scotland and England were not being treated in 'exactly the same way'. However, from the interview accounts it was clear that that people were not inclined to evaluate their national interests in direct comparison to Scotland. Respondents tended overwhelmingly to employ historical (past-present) rather than international (England-Scotland) comparisons. Consequently, people were typically inclined towards the view that, since the governance of Scotland has 'always' been 'different', and since devolution had not changed the governance of England, the situation for England has not materially changed.
Devolution understood as a matter of political rights.
Predictions that the establishment of the Scottish Parliament would fuel resentment among the population of England tended to be predicated on the assumption that people would inevitably evaluate the new political status quo in terms of its substantive outcomes. In practice, however, the interview respondents rarely employed this kind of logic. Rather, respondents' discussions of the Scottish Parliament typically involved appeals to abstract principles of procedural justice.
Specifically, the establishment of the Parliament was generally understood to be fair in so far as it reflected the rights of Scottish people to political self-determination. In view of predictions that the asymmetric character of the devolution settlement would provoke an English backlash against Scotland, it was interesting to note that, on the rare occasions that respondents did voice any resentment concerning the consequences of devolution for their own country, they typically attributed blame to the British Government rather than to the Scottish People.
As we shall see shortly, rights-based arguments could take a variety of forms, and respondents in particular disagreed about the extent to which rights-based arguments should be applied to England. However, the common view that the Scottish Parliament reflected the settled will of the Scottish people often led people to suggest that the population of England was not entitled to object, or even to express views on the subject: 1. Popular Nationalism.
Arguments classed as examples of Popular Nationalism tended to be used by respondents with relatively high levels of general political awareness and relatively high levels of domain-specific knowledge concerning the process of devolution.
These respondents typically claimed right-wing political views, and were often affiliated with non-mainstream political parties.
This cluster of opinions was characterised by a combination of two distinctive features. First was the explicit invocation of an ethnic conceptualization of nationhood in conjunction with the endorsement of political Nationalism as an abstract principle. This stance was reflected, amongst other things, by the respondent displaying concern over the distinction between England and Britain (including a tendency to self-categorize as 'English not British'), and voicing opposition to multiculturalism and EU integration.
The second distinctive feature involved the adoption of what Kazin (1998) terms the 'language of popularism'. This entailed the respondent treating their avowals of English identity as claims to commonality with other 'ordinary' English people. Typically, this also involved the respondent adopting the stance of speaking Speakers employing the discourse of Popular Nationalism typically adopted a 'rational' position in Rawls's (1996) HK Assuming that the changes we've got are irreversible, and it seems only fair that from an equitable stand point that yeah if you are going to go and have a Welsh assembly and a Scottish Parliament that they should in fact be something that was going to go and provide a sounding board for the English.
But, that said, I am not pro-European. So to that extent I am not anxious to go and see an English parliament. Because I think it would be so much easier for them to go and slide us into a region of Europe and nothing could be said about it. And to that extent, even though I can see it's unfair, I suppose if it came to a referendum I wouldn't in fact, go and vote for an English parliament.
Localite (cf. Merton, 1957 ) accounts tended to be used by people with little formal education and relatively little experience of geographical mobility. These respondents tended to be politically disengaged, and to possess only the most basic understanding of the process of UK constitutional change.
The main distinguishing feature of Localism discourses was, as the label suggests, that the speaker displayed a primary concern for issues understood to be personal, concrete and close to home, and displayed little interest in matters understood to be remote, generic or abstract. A concern for the personal and the local could also be evident in Popular Nationalism accounts. However, in this case, the speaker tended to elide the local with the national, and to treat their personal experiences, social networks and local area of residence as exemplifications of the generic construct of Englishness (cf. Cohen's, 1996 construct of personal nationalism). In contrast, respondents who adopted Localism repertoires tended to treat nationality in general, and Englishness in particular, as experience-distant constructs. In consequence, interviewers could experience great difficulty in eliciting conversation about the respondents' views concerning national issues, and about their personal sense of national identity ix .
Localite accounts rarely associated English national identity with entitlement to political voice. However, to put this in context, these respondents were generally disinclined to claim political voice on the basis of any abstract category membership.
Some respondents made a positive claim to political apathy, and adopted a don't know/don't care position in relation to devolution: Converse, 1964) . When asked to explain their views, respondents were inclined to produce minimal arguments ('why not?'), which typically rested on a banal (Billig, 1995) MH There must be, otherwise they wouldn't want their own government.
( (laughter)).
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Whereas people adopting a Popular Nationalism frame could extemporise around core beliefs concerning the value of national self-determination, people adopting Localism discourses were rarely able to discuss their endorsement of nationalist politics as a matter of abstract principle, or to maintain an extended line of political argument: will have an effect because-because of-stop the tape. I'm stuck ((laughter)).
Reasonable Pragmatism.
This analytic category embraces a range of arguments concerning devolved governance adopted by people from a variety of different backgrounds and mainstream party-political affiliations. The fact that the research sample was not representative in a statistical sense precludes precise estimates concerning the relative Devolution and English identity 20 distribution of particular styles of argument. However, previous research suggests that the kinds of accounts that I am classifying as examples of Reasonable Pragmatism tend to represent the most common kind of position adopted towards matters of nationhood and national identity in England (Condor, 1996; 2000; Condor & Abell, 2006) .
The styles of argument included in this category are reasonable in Sibley's (1953) sense of displaying a willingness to adopt a common standpoint and to evaluate political issues in the light of the interests of others. They are pragmatic in the sense of demonstrating a preparedness of compromise in the interests of social harmony and political moderation. Significantly, respondents who adopted a stance of Reasonable Pragmatism were inclined to position their views in direct opposition to the confrontational discourse of Popular Nationalism.
In the course of discussion, speakers adopting Reasonable Pragmatist stances generally evidenced concern for normative virtues of liberal democratic citizenship and values of pluralism. This often entailed a general suspicion of explicit invocations of nationalism and strong public claims to national identity, which tended to be regarded as antithetical to values of individualism, universalism and civility.
Respondents adopting a Reasonable Pragmatist perspective could describe their own sense of national identity in a variety of ways. However, they tended to orient to a common set of normative considerations in the course of claiming, or disclaiming, a particular sense of national identity. Specifically, these respondents were inclined to treat public claims to national identity as a communicative act that needed to be managed in the light of the sensitivities and interests of others.
From the vantage point of Reasonable Pragmatism, respondents could assemble a variety of different lines of argument concerning devolved governance. Scottish legal system come to that has a restricted shelf life given that in a few years hopefully we'll all be European anyway.
Another strategy used by respondents who voiced opposition to the principle of political nationalism was to employ non-symmetrical normative arguments, according to which the Scottish Parliament was supported with reference to generic values of rights to self-determination, but the prospect of English national self-governance rejected on the grounds of universal principles of anti-nationalism.
For example, in the first of the following extracts the speaker is responding to a question concerning his views on the Scottish Parliament: Finally, this research suggests that the relationship between constitutional attitudes and English national identity is rather more subtle than is often supposed.
There was no evidence to support the common contention that people in England simply fail to recognize themselves as English. In addition, whether an individual chose to define themselves as English or British or both or neither generally had little direct bearing upon the position they adopted concerning the Scottish Parliament, or concerning the possibility of Scottish independence or English self-governance.
Hence, rather than consider whether a social actor's sense of national identity relates to their attitudes concerning devolved governance, it may be more enlightening to ask how people understand their status as English to bear upon their views concerning constitutional politics. The basic finding to emerge from this research was that people in England do not currently accept asymmetric devolution because they lack a sense of English identity. On the contrary, most people view active engagement -and especially critical engagement -with the new political status quo as precisely incompatible with the normative requirements of public reason and civic responsibility incumbent upon themselves as members of the English majority.
